In my book, I state that George Bush and his administration wanted to get rid of Saddam, hence the CIA's apparent bending-over-backwards to state that Saddam indeed had WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction), despite the flimsy evidence.

In his book, Plan of Attack, Bob Woodward talks of even more factors, that would almost certainly have tilted the CIA's reports towards the 'conviction' that Saddam indeed had WMDs.

1. In August 2002, Vice-President Dick Cheney had declared, well before Tenet's infamous "slam-dunk" comment, that "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction."
2. A month later, President Bush himself had stated, "The Iraq regime possesses biological and chemical weapons."
3. Stu Cohen served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council (a body of senior intelligence officers). He stated that he didn't want any wishy-washy language such as 'maybe', 'probably', or 'likely' to be used in the highest-level intelligence report (called the National Intelligence Estimate) on Iraq's WMDs.

Put these three factors together. The President and Vice-President declare, before the actual intelligence report is produced, that Saddam has WMDs. Moreover, the acting chairman says he wants no 'doubtful' language to be used in the report. Is it surprising that the NIE turns out to be wrong?

David Kay, who led the Iraq Survey Group that was tasked with finding  the WMDs, said, "[I]t was trying to drive towards a policy conclusion where the information just simply didn't support it."

In which kind of system would you be able to drive towards a policy conclusion that the underlying information cannot support? You guessed it: a fear - dictatorship - system.

US army officer:  Subordinates should evaluate military leaders' performances

A US army officer has launched a stinging attack on the military top brass in an article titled "A failure in generalship" published in the Armed Forces Journal.

Lt Col Paul Yingling, whose unit was cited in a speech by the US President for its performance in Iraq, has said the generals have morally and intellectually failed in Iraq.

 Lt Col Yingling says that to prevent such mistakes of having the wrong generals at the top in future, subordinates should evaluate their leaders. Yingling writes, "The views of subordinates and peers play no role in an officer's advancement; to move up he must only please his superiors. In a system in which senior officers select for promotion those like themselves, there are powerful incentives for conformity. It is unreasonable to expect that an officer who spends 25 years conforming to institutional expectations will emerge as an innovator in his late forties."

Yingling adds "Junior officers and noncommissioned officers are often the first to adapt because they bear the brunt of failed tactics most directly.

"Junior leaders have valuable insights regarding the effectiveness of their leaders, but the current promotion system excludes these judgments. Incorporating subordinate and peer reviews into promotion decisions for senior leaders would produce officers more willing to adapt to changing circumstances, and less likely to conform to outmoded practices.

Yingling makes the point that "If America desires creative intelligence and moral courage in its general officer corps, it must create a system that rewards these qualities."

Read the full article here.